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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter evolves in its entirety from the Appellant's frivolous attempt to 
impede and obstruct the Respondent's lawful efforts to remove from its business 
premises an abandoned manufactured home in which the Appellant asserted a lien 
interest. The Appellant's untimely objection to the lien sale provided for in accordance 
with Idaho Code § 49-1705 was part of his announced and transparent scheme to 
extort money from the mobile home park owners rather than to remove the property in 
which he asserted a lien. 1 Appellant MACDONALD stated without equivocation to 
counsel for the Respondents, that by the time he was done the park owners would wish 
they had paid him to go away. When things didn't go quite as the Appellant wished, he 
proceeded to dispose of his interest in the mobile home, relinquish his claim of lien, 
abandon the prosecution of his objection to the lien sale he had filed with the 
Department of Transportation, and attempt to wash his hands of any culpability. 
Regrettably, by this time the Respondent had incurred thousands of dollars in loss of 
1 The Appellant's lien was based upon a contract for sale of the home by supposedly a 
third party. Appellant subsequently sued the titled owners trying to recover the balance 
in Kootenai County Case #CV 2011-8886. 
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rents, borne the enormous cost of removing the home, which had become a health 
hazard and lost all value, and incurred thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and costs 
as threatened by the Appellant. 
II. RELEVANT FACTS 
Respondent, IDAHO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., is a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Idaho, with its principal place of business in 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, doing business as THE RENTAL CONNECTION, hereinafter 
referred to as Respondent or IDAHO PROPERTY. IDAHO PROPERTY had and continues 
to have a contractual agreement with THOMSEN FAMILY TRUST, ROY SCHONS and 
EVAN THOMSEN, owners of that certain property located at 1753 E. Lunceford, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho, which property is more commonly known as Dorchester Park, to obtain 
renters and collect rents for the spaces located within Dorchester Park (a mobile home 
community). (See Tr p243, Real Property Management Agreement) 
Appellant DON MACDONALD, hereinafter referred to as Appellant or 
MACDONALD, was the lienholder on a 1969 Pathfinder HS TL which was located in 
Space #2 of Dorchester Park on or about August 18, 2010. The Mobile Space Rental 
Agreement for said 1969 Pathfinder HS TL was terminated, and Respondent requested 
the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL be removed from Dorchester Park. On or about November 
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9, 2011, the residents and the titled owners of the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL vacated and 
abandoned said 1969 Pathfinder HS TL. 2 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-2001, et seq, Respondent obtained an 
Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale from the Idaho Transportation Department and 
gave Appellant MACDONALD, the lienholder, notice of the same. (See Tr p23, Exhibit 
"B" to Respondent's Complaint) Appellant MACDONALD filed a Lien Sale Declaration of 
Opposition on or about April 4, 2012. (See Tr p24, Exhibit "C" to Respondent's 
Complaintj Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY was thereafter disallowed from selling or 
removing the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL until the Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition was 
rescinded or the Lien was satisfied. (See Tr p231-232 Affidavit of Ginger Thomsen) 
Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY was informed by the Idaho Department of 
Transportation that MACDONALD was disputing the validity of the lien because there is 
no definition of lienholder within Idaho Code§ 55-2009A(2), in spite of the fact that the 
motor vehicle code clearly defines a lienholder. The Department of Transportation 
2 It should be noted that the home had been previously purchased from the Macdonald 
Family Limited Trust of which Appellant MACDONALD is a general partner, and 
Appellant individually brought suit against the titled owners of the 1969 Pathfinder HS 
TL in Kootenai County Case #CV 2011-8886 and thereafter took default on December 
13, 2011. 
3 It is important to note that the Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition was not timely filed 
in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code§ 55-2009B(3)(e), however, it was 
honored by the Department of Transportation. 
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enforced the Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition and no lien sale was permitted of the 
abandoned home. Not remarkably, since it was Appellant MACDONALD'S sole purpose 
to delay and obstruct the course of the legal proceedings required by statute, he never 
prosecuted any objection to the claim of possessory lien nor was it ever timely resolved. 
On or about July 18, 2012, counsel for the Respondent caused to be sent to 
Appellant MACDONALD a Notice of Trespass, Notice of Abandonment of the 
manufactured home, and demand for monies due and owing as a result of the 
lienholder/ Appellant's refusal to remove the home from the premises or permit the sale 
thereof. MACDONALD was clearly and unequivocally informed that his specific actions 
as lienholder in obstructing the ability of Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY to dispose of 
the home would result in significant monetary damages, including loss of rents, and 
that IDAHO PROPERTY viewed the presence of the mobile home as a trespass. 
Appellant MACDONALD was given every opportunity to resolve the matter without the 
expense or hardship of litigation, and informed of the consequences if he failed to do 
so. Demand was appropriately made pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120 not less than 
ten days preceding the filing of the Complaint which gives rise to the present appeal. 
(See Tr p25-27) 
Subsequent to the letter sent to Appellant MACDONALD, Appellant MACDONALD 
contacted the law offices of CHARLES B. LEMPESIS, and made it expressly clear that he 
RESPONDENTS REPLY BRIEF, PAGE 4 
would not comply with the demand to remove the home and demanded Respondent 
"pay him at least $10,000 to go away or they would be 'sorry if they didn't111• Appellant 
MACDONALD made it indubitably clear that it was his intention to obstruct, delay and 
cause expense for the Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY in order to make it abandon its 
claim and pay him for his mobile home. {See Tr p54-55 Affidavit of Charles B. 
Lempesis) 
A Complaint in this matter was filed on or about October 11, 2012, and 
thereafter service upon Appellant MACDONALD was diligently attempted for months 
without success. It was discovered that the address he had used in his Lien Sale 
Declaration of Opposition was neither his home nor place of business. Oddly enough, 
Appellant MACDONALD would call the law offices of CHARLES B. LEMPESIS, and speak 
with either his assistant or ask to speak with counsel to reiterate his demands. 
However, when it was requested he provide his address or accept service, he 
repeatedly declined. {See Tr p28-30 Motion and Affidavit for Service of Process by 
Publication) 
Upon order of the District Court, Appellant MACDONALD was subsequently 
served by publication. Following service, the course and conduct of these proceedings 
has continued to evidence Appellant MACDONALD'S scheme and strategy. In a further 
attempt to delay the proceedings, Appellant MACDONALD thereafter failed to Answer 
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the Complaint in any manner until a Notice of Default had been filed with Court, at 
which time he provided general denial. 
In a continuing effort to continue to dispose of the 1969 treasure, Respondent 
repeatedly sought the permission of the Department of Transportation to conduct a 
Lien Sale since no objection had been prosecuted by Appellant MACDONALD. It was 
learned during this process that Appellant MACDONALD had in fact transferred his lien 
on December 5, 2012 to one DON HARRIS, whose actual identity and interest in the 
home has never been discovered. On or about January 28, 2013, Barbara at the 
Department of Transportation was contacted to see of an Authorization to Conduct Lien 
Sale could be obtained with the new lienholder, and Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY was 
informed that until the lien was released or the objection was withdrawn, the 
Department of Transportation would not approve an Application for Lien Sale and the 
only recourse was to file an action with the Court. {See Tr p.231, Affidavit of Ginger 
Thomsen) Interestingly, it was discovered that DON HARRIS, whose identity still 
escapes counsel for the Respondent, has the same e-mail address and post office box 
as Appellant DON MACDONALD. {See Tr p233-236 Affidavit of Charles B. Lempesis Re: 
Don Harris) 
The nearly 50 year old mobile home (known in 1969 as a trailer house) became 
in desperate need of repair and untenantable. According to best estimates of experts, 
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it had a negative value, and been overtaken by mice and other vermin. This is in 
addition to the mold which surfaced as a result of the multiple times it had suffered 
water damage. (See Tr p57, Affidavit of Ned Thomsen) Recognizing that the mobile 
home was quickly becoming a health hazard, Respondent had no choice but to pursue 
its remedy seeking that the Court order the removal of home or grant Summary 
Judgment. 
In an continuing confirmation of the frivolity of Appellant MACONDALD'S claims 
and obstruction of the Lien Sale, on or about July 16, 2013, two weeks prior to the 
scheduled Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY received by 
facsimile correspondence a Satisfaction of Lien (See Tr p240, Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendants' Opposition for Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and to Defendants' 
Opposition for Plaintiffs Motion for Removal of Home}, finally enabling the foreclosure 
and sale of the abandoned mobile home. 
On July 31, 2013, the Court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that 
Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law. Appellant 
requested reconsideration and on September 10, 2013 the Court denied Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
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Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY was then able and did proceed with the 
Application to Conduct Lien Sale and the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL was removed from the 
property. 
Due to Appellant's acts and omissions, Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY incurred 
damages in the form of lost rents, taxes, attorneys' fees and costs. The Court properly 
awarded Respondent reimbursement for the same. 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from a Final Judgment entered pursuant to the Amended 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum Decision 
and Order Granting Plaintiff's Requests for Costs and Attorney Fees entered in District 
Court. 
The District Court resolved the matter in favor of Respondent and declared the 
1969 Pathfinder Mobile Home located upon Respondent's property at 1753 East 
Lunceford, Space #2 to be abandoned, awarded damages to Respondent for monthly 
rent lost and other costs incurred in the amount of $10,349.26 and ordered Appellant to 
reimburse Respondent the sum of $11,657.95 for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
the prosecution of the matter. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent offers no additional issues to present to this Honorable Court. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondent is entitled to reimbursement of its attorneys fees incurred in the 
response to this appeal pursuant to IAR 41 and the applicable provisions of Idaho Code 
§§ 12-120, 12-120(1) and 12-121. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent and Respondent's counsel, as well as the Court, appreciate that 
Appellant MACDONALD appears prose, and may or may not be knowledgeable with 
regards to the applicable law in this matter. Having said that, Appellant MACDONALD is 
held to the same standard as any other party litigant and can be treated no differently 
in application of the statutes, law and rules that apply to all parties and litigants. 
I. SfANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Explaining to this Honorable Court the standard of review for an award of 
Summary Judgment is similar to telling Noah about the flood. In the interest of brevity, 
Respondent notes simply that the Appellant provided no sworn testimony in the form of 
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an Affidavit required by the rules, and that the "sworn statement", notably not signed 
by a Notary Public, provided the Court with no bona fide factual dispute other than the 
mere allegations and arguments which were noted by the Court. 
"Rule 56(f) clearly requires a party who is unable to present 
affidavits which factually justify his opposition to the motion to state by 
affidavit the reasons he is unable to oppose the motion by use of 
affidavits. Appellant presented no affidavits in opposition of the motion 
and presented no affidavit which stated his reasons for not being able to 
oppose the motion by affidavit.'TCourt's Emphasis) Golay v. Loomis, 118 
Idaho 387 at 389. 
IRCP 56( c) provides in pertinent part: 
"If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must 
do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The adverse party 
shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the 
hearing." 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
the party". Rule 56( e) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
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Respondent properly filed its Motion for Summary Judgment along with 
supporting Affidavits. Appellant did not present any Affidavits as required by Rule and 
the Court awarded Summary Judgment. 
II. IS APPELLANT'S PLEADING AN AFFIDAVIT? 
Appellanfs pleading submitted in opposition to the Summary Judgment motion is 
not an Affidavit nor anything close to an Affidavit. Even Shakespeare would have to 
admit that the document submitted by Appellant by any other name is not an Affidavit. 
A. Appellant's Opposition for Plaintiff's Motion for summary Judgment 
does not contain the signature of a Notary Public (See Tr p179J and therefore does not 
meet the requirements of an affidavit. 
Idaho Code § 51-102(5) states: 
"'Affidavif means a declaration in writing, under oath, and sworn to or 
affirmed by the declarant before a person authorized to administer oaths." 
"The seal shall be impressed below or near the notary public's official 
signature on each notary certificate which he administers." (Emphasis 
added) Idaho Code§ 51-102(3) 
B. There are no facts asserted in Appellanrs Opposition for Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment that meet the standard of evidence to be considered by 
the Court in opposition to Respondent's motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, 
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Appellant's Opposition rather disjunctively sets forth various opinion and arguments but 
is replete with the omission of any facts to be properly considered by the Court. The 
"Factual Discrepancies" which Appellant is hoping to state as sworn truth are actually 
matters of opinion and arguments of law. 
C. IRCP 56( c) requires both the service of an answering brief and any 
opposing affidavits that the party chooses to make available to the Court. There is no 
provision that only verifying a pleading serves to magically make a memorandum into 
an affidavit. 
The controlling case on this issue is found in Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 
387 at 389. Please note that the Court was sufficiently adamant in its judgment that 
the words "by affidavit" are italicized in the body of the Court's Opinion. 
The District Court correctly considered Appellant's Opposition for Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment as an answering brief. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
Even in the light most favorable to the Appellant/Defendant, there are simply no 
genuine material facts that are at issue. Appellant's debtor abandoned the mobile 
home. (See Appellants Brief, p1, para3) Respondent's filed an Application for Lien Sale 
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(See Tr p23, Exhibit "B" to Respondents Complaint) and Appellant objected thereto. 
(See Tr p24, Exhibit "C' to Respondent's Complaint) Thereafter, Appellant refused to 
withdraw the objection or to remove the home when requested in writing to do so. 
Respondent was unable to proceed with any mitigation of the damages that were 
accruing without formal adjudication regarding Appellant's Lien Sale Declaration of 
Opposition unless Appellant withdrew his opposition or his lien. (See Tr p.231, Affidavit 
of Ginger Thomsen and Tr p260, Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs July 1 Efh 
Opposition) Appellant's acts and omissions clearly obstructed and impeded the lawful 
foreclosure and removal of the mobile home abandoned by Appellant's debtor and 
Appellant should be liable therefor. There are no genuine issues of material fact and 
Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The District Court 
properly granted the same. In so doing, JUDGE SIMPSON observed: 
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-
moving party must 'make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial.m Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, _, 245 P.3d 
1009, 1012 (2011), (quoting Bade// v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 
P.2d 125, 127 (1988)). 
"At the July 30, 2013 Hearing, Defendant Don Macdonald requested an 
extension of time to file affidavits. According to IRCP 56( c), however, '[i]f 
the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must do 
so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing.' Defendants did not 
file any such affidavits prior to the July 30, 2013 hearing, nor did 
Defendants make any request for an extension of time to file such 
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"affidavits until at the July 30, 2013 hearing. Therefore, the Court denied 
Defendants' request for an extension of time. 
"As noted above, Defendants in this action have not set forth any 
affidavits; Defendants seek to rely solely on the denials found in their 
pleadings and have not controverted the facts as set forth in Plaintiff's 
Verified Complaint and supporting affidavits; nevertheless, as stated in 
IRCP 56( e) 'an adverse party may not rest upon the mere ... denials of 
that party's pleadings[.] Because Defendants rely solely on their 
pleadings, Defendants have set forth no specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue of material fact. The Court will consider the undisputed 
facts as established by Plaintiff's Affidavits and Verified Pleadings. Based 
upon the undisputed facts the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled 
summary judgment as a matter of law". Tr p273-274 Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
The relief requested of the Court and granted to the Respondent by Judge 
SIMPSON'S Order Granting Summary Judgment was based upon the specific allegations 
against Appellant, and the Court's finding that the damages were occasioned by 
Appellant's actions and omissions in frivolously objecting to the conduct of lien sale of 
the abandoned home. The continuing trespass of the mobile home, the loss of rents, 
and all other damages incurred by the Respondent were the direct result of the acts 
and omissions of Appellant MACDONALD and no other person. 
IV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
When considering a motion for reconsideration, the trial court should take into 
account any new facts or additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur 
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d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 R2d 
1026, 1038 (1990). See also Noreen v. Price Development Co. Ltd. Partnership, 135 
Idaho 816, 819, 25 P.3d 129, 132 (Ct. App. 2001). In submitting a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
moving party has the burden of bringing to the Court's attention through affidavit, 
depositions or admissions, new facts bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202, 
205, 879 P.2d at 1037. (The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's 
attention to new facts.') Where a moving party does not present any new facts, it must 
still demonstrate "errors of law or fact in the initial decision." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 
Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"This Court reviews a trial court's decision of whether to grant or deny a 
motion for reconsideration under an abuse of discretion standard. Van v. 
Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). 'A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as 
discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the 
correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise 
of reason.' 0 1Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 
P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 
75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 408 (2005))". Arregui v. Gal/egos-Main, 291 P.3d 
1000, 153 Idaho 801 (Idaho 2012) 
Appellants Motion for Reconsideration brought forth no new facts or errors of law. 
Further, Respondent directed the Court's attention to the fact that there was no 
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signature on the notary provision of the pleading. The Court did not abuse its 
discretion in its denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. 
V. THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$10,349.26 FOR RENT AND OTHER COSTS INCURRED FROM NOVEMBER 25, 
2011 THROUGH JULY 31, 2013. 
Due to Appellant's Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition and his failure to remove 
the abandoned property as requested, Respondent sustained damages as set forth in 
the Affidavit of Ellen Booker (See Tr p341, 342) in the following amounts: 
1. Under the terms of the rental agreement that was in place at the 
time the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL was moved onto the property, Respondent was to 
receive the sum of $295 per month. From November 25, 2011 through the Courts 
Order of July 31, 2013, Respondent had damages in the form of lost rent in the sum of 
$5,949.17 in rents. Further, Respondent was entitled to late fees of Forty Dollars per 
month, plus Five Dollars ($5) per day for every day after the fifth (5th) day of the 
month; therefore the total late fees due from November 25, 2011 through the Court's 
Order of July 31, 2013 is $3,815.00. These were the ordinary amounts being paid by 
tenants throughout Dorchester Park. Appellant was made aware of the prospective loss 
that was accruing in the July 18, 2012 letter from Charles B. Lempesis (See Tr p25-27). 
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2. In addition to the above listed amounts, Respondent had to pay the 
2011 taxes and prepay 2012 taxes in order to file the Application for Lien Sale in the 
amount of $585.09. 
The damages sustained by Respondent due to Appellant's Lien Sale Declaration 
of Opposition is $10,349.26. Appellant's Opposition to Lien Sale is the sole cause of 
said damages and Appellant should reimburse Respondent for the same. 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove in Section III (Summary Judgment Was 
Properly Granted), which in the interest of brevity will not be set forth in this section, 
Respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the damages it sustained due to Appellant's 
acts and omissions. 
VI. THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,657.95. 
1. Idaho Code§ 12-120 
"Except as provided in subsections (3) and ( 4) of this section, in any 
action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) 
or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of 
the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as 
attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees, for the 
prosecution of the action, written demand for the payment of such claim 
must have been made on the defendant not less than ten (10) days 
before the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney's fees 
shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant 
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an 
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amount at least equal to ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount 
awarded to the plaintiff.f/ Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) 
The amount pleaded in the Complaint was less than $35,000, therefore 
this case falls within the parameters set forth by Idaho Code§ 12-120(1). Additionally, 
on July 18, 2012 Respondenes counsel sent Appellant a Notice of Trespass/Demand for 
Monies Due and Owing /Notice of Abandonment. This written demand for payment was 
made nearly three months prior to the commencement of this action on October 11, 
2012, and no amount was tendered by Plaintiff prior to commencement of the action. 
{See Tr p287-297) 
The District Court properly found that Respondent was entitled to an 
award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(1). 
2. Idaho Code§ 12-121 
The Respondent was the prevailing party as set forth in the Courfs 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting PlaintiWs Requests for Costs and Fees {See 
Tr p356-360). 
"In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal 
or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of 
attorney's fees. The term 'party' or 'parties' is defined to include any 
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person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. Idaho Code§ 12-121 
and 
"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which 
at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing 
party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any 
statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho 
Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts 
presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; but attorney fees shall 
not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, on a default 
judgment." IRCP 54(e)(1) 
Whether to award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is a matter of 
the Court/s discretion; a reviewing court will not disturb such a decision unless there is 
an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Goodliffe, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 
(2004). "Attorney fees are properly awarded where a cases is defended unreasonably.~~ 
(Emphasis provided) Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 315, 319, 698 P.2d 
377, 381 (Ct. App. 1985). In evaluating the defendant's unreasonableness, the Court 
should look to the entire course of the litigation. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 685, 
778 P.2d 804, 807 (1989). 
The District Court properly took into consideration Appellanrs actions 
which brought about this prolonged litigation, including but not limited to Appellanes 
filing of the Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, then later claiming the Declaration 
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should have been declared invalid. The District Court found Appellant acted frivolously 
and unreasonably in the defense of this case, and therefore properly found that 
Respondent was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
121. 
Based upon the facts before the Court and in consideration of all of the 
IRCP 54(e)(3) factors, the District Court properly awarded the sum of $11,270 in 
attorneys' fees. 
3. IRCP 54(d)(l)(A) 
Under IRCP 54(d)(1)(A), "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the 
prevailing party ... unless otherwise ordered by the Court." Further IRCP 54(d)(1)(C) 
outlines the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: (i) Court filing fees; and 
(ii) Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by 
a public officer or other person. Respondent paid (i) a $96 court filing fee, (ii) a $75 
process server fee, and (iii) a $216.95 publication fee. The District Court properly 
found that Respondent was entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right in the sum 
of $387.95. 
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VII. IS APPELLANT THE OWNER OF THE MOBILE HOME? 
The Department of Transportation deemed the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL to be 
abandoned by the titled owners of the home. The Application for Lien Sale was sent to 
both the titled owners and the lienholder. No response was received from the titled 
owners. Appellant filed the Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition claiming an interest in 
the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL, the only interest besides the possessory lienholder. 
Whether Appellant is the owner of the mobile home is immaterial in this matter. 
Respondent attempted to hold a lien sale, wherein any amounts over and above the 
those due to Respondent would have been paid to Appellant. Appellant objected to the 
same, failed to take responsibility for the home, and attempted to extort funds from 
Respondent (See Tr p31). 
All damages claimed, attorneys' fees incurred and costs borne by the 
Respondents were the direct, intentional consequence of the actions of Appellant 
MACDONALD in trying to secure payment by the mobile home park owners by 
frivolously asserting an objection to the lien foreclosure, and thereafter delaying, 
impeding and abusing the legal process to further Appellant's lame and legally 
unsupported scheme. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the hearing before the Honorable BENJAMIN SIMPSON on the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, counsel for Respondent noted that "the first thing one should do 
when one finds himself in a hole is to quit digging". Mr. MACDONALD suffered an 
economic loss when the titled owners to the home, upon which Appellant MACDONALD 
maintained a lien, was abandoned. Rather than accept the consequences of this loss 
and mitigate his damages, Appellant MACDONALD continued digging. Appellant 
MACDONALD chose a path in which he thought he could extort money to offset his loss 
from the park owners who were anxious to remove the fifty-year old trailer from the 
premises. Appellant MACDONALD clearly knew that it would cost them money in lost 
rents, attorneys' fees and removal costs if he left the home there. Regrettably, in our 
system of justice, Appellant was absolutely correct. It would have been cheaper to pay 
Appellant to go away. The Respondent chose not to do so and pursued its remedy by 
lawful means in an Idaho court of law. The Honorable BENJAMIN SIMPSON applied 
that law granting Summary Judgment and an appropriate award of damages and 
attorneys' fees, which the Respondent hoped someday to recover. By this appeal, 
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MACDONALD continues to dig. Respondent prays that this Honorable Court will take 
away his shovel. 
Respectfully submitted this J.3.Ji.fday of June, 2014. 
CHARLES B. LEMPESIS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J3H....fday of June, 2014, I served two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing as follows: 
to: 
Don Macdonald 
8485 W. Sunset Road, Apt. #208 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-2249 
Via: 
-X U. S. Mail 
__ Facsimile 
__ Personal Delivery 
~(li«_ DzCJJ~U~ 
CHARLENE BEAMER 
Assistant to CHARLES B. LEMPESIS 
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